Infanticide: the worth ofan infant under law was fairly widespread. Records, both ecclesiastical and secular, were often not kept as to every crime or sin. And those records that do survive are often fragmentary. More important, the circumstances surrounding the act of infanticide almost dictated a dearth of comprehensive detection and consequent documentation for the following reasons. First, the most common means of infanticide was overlaying (i.e., taking the infant into bed and suffocating it with one's body). Overlaying, of course, could be accidental, but while lack of intent mitigated the degree of penalty, it did not absolve the perpetrator.8 Death by overlaying become the concern of the church, exclusively. And the large number of references to it in penitentials and other church documents underlines the fact that it must have been a persistent and quite common problem. Second, it was a secret crime. The evidence (the infant's corpse) could easily be destroyed in the rural environment. Thus, it may be surmised that the church was not cognizant ofthe majority ofinfanticides that took place.
Barbara Kellum reports that Columban, in c. 600, had set penance for overlaying at one year on bread and water and two additional years without flesh or wine.9 The penance could be reduced ifthe sinner was a serf or very poor.10 Thispenancebecame fairly standard, and Kellum points out that it was relatively light "when one considers that the punishment for even accidental killing of an adult was five years, three of these on bread and water".11
Bartholomew of Exeter also referred to overlaying in the twelfth century and decreed the standard penance. He also included a new method ofcommission, that ofscalding.12 Evidently, such accidents, which occurred while the child was on the hearth, were prevalent enough for inclusion in the penitentials. The thirteenth-century penitential of Thomas of Chobham brought yet other methods of infanticide into official purview, such as refusal to nurse and death by the mother's own hand.18 These acts were technically termed homicide, but priests were granted wide discretion (despite the standard three-year penance) in establishing the appropriate punishments.
In addition to penitentials, church legislation of the middle 1200s repeatedly spoke of the dangers of overlaying, a further testament to its prevalence. As set forth in the Statutes of Winchester I in 1224:
[65] Sub interminatione anathematis sepius in eccicsiis inhibeatur ne mulieres infantulos suos in lectis suis iuxta se collocent ne eos opprimant dormiedo. Under thret of excommunication from the church, women should be restramined from keeping their children close by in bed lest they smother them while in sleep. Item, districte precipiatur ut mulla mulier ponat puerum suum in lecto secum, nisi sit ad minus trium annorum vel circiter. Likewise, it is to be known that no woman lay down her child in bed with her unless it is or is about three years ofage."
At least fifteen other references are made in ecclesiastical statutes in the councils of the era to the dangers of taking a child into bed.17 While the penance might appear to be shockingly light by modem penal standards, in fact, it was merely a recognition by the church of a method of population control by the poor that may have been necessary, in many cases, for survival.
Another factor discernible among these ecclesiastical statutes is that all admonitions are addressed to females (mulier or femina), never to a male or even parens. Indeed, most prosecutions, both secular and ecclesiastical, were of women;15 moreover, from the use of the possessive (suwn) with puerun, it is clear that the church was concerned with the classic form of infanticide, i.e., a mother, not an unrelated woman, smothering her infant.
Overlaying [household] and wyth they wyf? Hast thou also by hyre I-layn, And so by-twene you they chylde I-slayn? Also they chyldre that were schvwes [wicked] Has thou 1-taght hem gode thenes [manners] ?"
Here the sin of overlaying an infant is juxtaposed with not being a good samaritan and not teaching shrewish children good manners. What might the parish priest have considered appropriate punishment for such minor sins, which here included the taking ofa human life?
The penance for overlaying, however, was not always the three-year abstinence discussed earlier, for in the later Middle Ages the penalties were not only more severe, 1 Ibid., p. 183 (trans.: Damme) TIbid., p. 214 (trans.: Damme) 17Ibid., pp. 2,32,70,140-141,204-205,214,234-235,274,352,410,453,457,520, 589-590,634- A number of cases of this type appear in the Placita Corone, but again, it is doubtful that these are records of infant drownings. In fact, the Latin transcriptions of these cases use the words filius or filia, which convey no age in particular, but suggest something older than infantus.
So while it might be prudent to disregard the majority of drownings, the following case merits more notice:
A two-year-old girl was found drowned in the East ditch (of York). Maud, the nurse found her and has come. No one is suspected. Judgement, Misadventure."
While this case could not strictly be termed infanticide (the killing of an infant one year or less of age), it is noteworthy for two reasons. First, in light of Henry l's statute then in force (making infanticide committed by someone other than a parent a crime of homicide on par with that of an adult homicide), it is logical that the nurse's discovery of the little girrs death was automatically suspect and warranted a coroner's verdict. Second, the coroner here used puella, rather thanfilia or femina, to describe the girl. The use of this word coupled with her tender age may strengthen the disregard of the majority ofthe drownings ofvarious sons and daughters recorded here.
More intriguing are the two other cases in the York rolls that mention pueri, denoting a young male child, although perhaps not an infant:
A boy was found dead shut in a chest in the field of Bilbrough. Serlo of Bilbrough found him and has died. No one is suspected. Judgment, It is not known who he was."
A boy was found dead in an earthn pot in a pit. Amabel found him first, and the jurors say that Hervey Crppes and Agnes his wife are suspected and therefore let them be taken."
The savagery of the above crimes might indicate infanticides carried out in secret upon illegitimate infants. But nothing more is known regarding these deaths. Here, finally, the ages of the infants are recorded; moreover, the inquest established the accidental circumstances under which death took place. The two methods in evidence here (drowning and scalding) are those which were mentioned frequently in church law on infanticide. Yet, even simple negligence was not alleged. The two cases above also demonstrate the secular parallel to ecclesiastical compurgation, that of producing pledges. These pledges seemed to be a frequent defence employed in secular prosecutions ofall types.
Another defence which seems to have been used when secular authorities took jurisdiction over infanticide by a parent was insanity. Barbara Hannawalt, writing on the female felon of the period, points out that the insanity defence was one unique to infanticide:
Cases arising from insanity were among the few in which motivations were fully discussed. Insanity was a fairly uncommon plea in gol delivery, but of these cas, that of a mother killing her children was the most usual. These unfortunate women all had a history of derangement, or were suicidal, or had been sick with a high fever. Agnes, wife of Roger Moyses, an example ofthe first type of cae, killed her young son, Adam, during one of her frequent bouts of insanity (amentia). Emma, wife of Henry Wolfrom of Cantele, also suffered a period of "demented and vexed" behavior before killing her child. Other The insanity defences employed here seem very liberal by the modem standards to be reviewed; however, again most of the victims were over one year of age, and were thus not really subjects of infanticide. This might explain the secular jurisdiction. And
Hannawalt goes on to report that "there was only one case ofinfanticide [the killing of a child under a year old] in 2,933 homicides reported in gaol delivery and coroners' rolls".49
A few other infanticides have been recorded in secular court records, and once again, the insanity plea was readily accepted and the accused acquitted.50
Of the secular child-killing cases looked at here, and in nearly all others reported to secular authority that survived,"" the courts concluded death resulted from misadventures or accidents. Insanity and pledges were readily accepted by the courts, and no criminal intent was found. Only in the case of Hervey and Agnes Crappes were suspects bound over to receive the king's justice. And, strangely enough, none of the cases involved suffocation by overlaying-the most prevalent method of infanticide. Indeed, most of the cases discussed were probably not those of infanticide, but rather the killing of an older child. Perhaps the crime of infanticide by overlaying and other means, which are so difficult to detect and for which intent is nearly impossible to ascertain, was left to the church.
All the above examples of child-killing repeatedly reinforce the idea that the infant's life was not equal to that of an adult or even a more fully developed child. While ecclesiastical and secular courts called an infant's death homicide, in practice, it was dealt with as something quite less.
EVOLUTION OF INFANTICIDE LAWS IN ENGLAND
Although the focus of this paper is the attitudes towards infanticide found in medieval England, it is necessary to review how these attitudes, manifested in the legal system, persisted, and can be found in later English statutes. A brief review of these statutes will be useful in tracing the evolution ofmodem attitudes toward infanticide.
Infanticide In passing this act, parliament was taking cognizance of the great peril to the lives of illegitimate children to which the mores of society had subjected them, and was equating their deaths with murder of an adult. The law also reversed the common law presumption of dead birth. Before passage of the act, in a court proceeding for alleged infanticide, the prosecution had to rebut the presumption that the infant was stillborn (and therefore no crime had been committed). Under the 1623 statute, the accused in such a proceeding would have to rebut the presumption that the child was born alive (i.e., the law presumed a live birth, and thus presumed a crime had been committed because the infant was found dead). 
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In the year 1668 at Ayksbury a married woman ofgood reputation being delivered of a child and not having slept manynights fell into atemporaryphrenzy,and kildher infantinthe absenceof any company; but company coming in, she told them, that she had kiled her infant, and there it lay; she was brought to gaol presently, and after some sleep she recovered her understanding, but marvelled how or why she came thither; she was indicted for murder, and upon her trial the whole matter appearing it was left to the jury with this direction, that if it did appear that she had any use of reason when she did it, they were to find her guilty; but if they found her under a phrenzy, tho by reason of her late delivery and want of sleep, they should acquit her; that had there been any occasion to move her to this fact, as to hid her shame, which is ordinarily the case of such as are delivered of bastard chldren and destroy them; or if there had been jealousy in her husband, that the child had been none of his, or if she hid the infant, or denied the fact, these had been evidences, that the phrenzy was counterfeit; but none of these appearing, and the honesty and virtuous deportment of the woman in her health being known to the jury, and many circumstance of insanity appearing, the jury found her not guilty to the satisfaction ofall that heard it.,, Here, society's stigmatization provided a motive to a servant-girl mother to kill her bastard child, but a mother "of good reputation" who killed her legitimate infant appeared to have no motive and consequently must be insane (and could be acquitted). Thus, the insanity plea of a respectable matron of Aylesbury was readily accepted while that ofpoor Sinah Jones was summarily rejected.
J. W. Jeudwine, commenting on these cases and others, states that "[w]hat probably saved [these women]-in the cases in which they were saved-was the increasing reluctance of juries to convict for murder in such cases [;] [t]hey would grasp at any suggestion that the baby had been stillborn, or had died in the course of birth, or had been accidentally killed". 60 The requirement under the 1623 Act that the accused prove the baby was stillborn was an emormous burden of proof to sustain, and it is not surprising that the statute was repealed in 1803 and replaced by Lord Ellenborough's Act which reinstated the common law presumption of dead (still)birth. That act also provided that women indicted for such offences would be treated under the laws and rules of evidence governing murder indictments except that if the accused were acquitted of murder, the jury could find an alternative verdict of two years' imprisonment if the illegitimate infant's death had been concealed. 61 Additionally, the 1803 act also made the administration ofsubstances to bring on a miscarriage an offence. ' The law was extended in 1828 to cover mothers ofall infants, whether illegitimate or not." The main thrust of the statute was against concealment; moreover, the act provided that "it shall not be necessary to prove whether the child died before, at, or after birth"."
There was great reluctance, however, on the part of juries to consider infanticide/ concealments as murders. The last execution for infanticide was in 1849. The verdict was delivered on one Rebecca Smith who, the evidence showed, deliberately poisoned her infant and had probably disposed of other children similarly. The reluctance, even refusal, of the Crown to seek the death penalty for infanticide was institutionalized when, in 1864, it became the practice of the prosecutor (the Home Office) "to advise the commutation of the death penalty when a woman was convicted of murdering her own child while it was under or not much over the age of twelve months".67
A great part ofthis sentiment toward leniency to the mother was based on the almost visceral "feeling" that such a crime simply could not be a rational act, although this feeling was not often articulated. But one commentator before the Capital Punishment Commission did state:
... women in that condition do get the strogest symptoms ofwhat amounts almost to temporary madness, and ... often hardly know what they are about, and will do things which they have no settled or deliberate intention whatever of doing .... [YJou cannot estimate the loss to the child itself, you know nothing about it at all. With regard to the public it causes no alarm, because it is a crime which can be committed only by mothers upon theirnewly born children."
Jeudwine also recounts the feeling of Justice Bramwell who tried a woman for infanticide:
Another case which I raemmber was one of the most painfl cases that I ever tried. A young women had an illegtimate child a year old: she was very fond of it and behaved well to it. What particular thing so disturbed her I do not know, but I have some reason to suppose that she was about to be married and that a person had threatened to inform her intended husband that his brother was the father of the chfld.... On a Sunday morning the child's clothes were hanging before the fire to dry and she was evidently intending to dress it and take it out and use it well, as she had always done. She cut its throat, and she nrshed out into the street and said that she had done so.... I canot in my own mind believe that that woman was as mad as the law would require her to be . . . but it was an act of such a charcter that the only address to the jury was "'This woman may have hada sudden condition ofmind come upon her, in which she really did not know what she was doing." She ws a very decent looking young woman; everybody in the court wept, the counsel on both sides and the jury and everybody; and the result was that she was acquitted." It seems, from the case above, the normal rules ofevidence and other legal niceties were cast away during an infanticide trial. Emotional reaction, not the rule of law, was paramount, and the minds ofjury and jurist could not accept that such a heinous act could be committed by a rational person-the accused's mind had to be deranged, if only temporarily.
What is unique in the insanity defence for infanticide is its radical departure from 
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Catherine Damme And, having to prove that the balance of the accused's mind was disturbed was a much less onerous burden of proof to sustain than trying to show that she had been "deprived of her ordinary self-control" (the 1872 revision) or did not know the nature and quality ofher act (the McNaughten Defence).
The last problem of the Infanticide Act was the ambiguity as to how old a "newly born" child was. When, in 1927, a woman was tried and convicted for murder rather than infanticide because the victim was thirty-five days old and not "newly born", parLament realized clarification was imperative.78 This quantitative defect was corrected in the Infanticide Act of 1938 by inclusion of all infants under twelve months of ageas subjects ofinfanticide.7'
Although prison sentences were mandated by the modern infanticide laws, the following table shows a shift from impositions of penal time to probation (often with psychiatric treatment or commitment to a psychiatric institution). AMERICAN LAW Law in the United States does not exhibit the same preoccupation with infanticide as does English law; in fact, no distinction between homicide and infanticide is made in America. The basic reason for this difference in emphasis lies in the cultural and historical roots ofthe U.S. legal system.
As a colony of England, the United States was administered under English statutory and common law. After independence, the states adopted the English common law which existed before independence and which then assured continuity of precedent in judicial procedures. The United States had no medieval experience to draw upon other than that of England. Moreover, the colonies that united to form a nation did not have an established church with jurisdiction over public sin. At the time the English jurists were carving out a distinction for infanticide in law (1803), America had just begun developing its own legal system within the traditions ofits inherited common law.
It is easier to ascertain English attitudes toward infanticide because nearly all statutes are national in scope-i.e., they pertain to the whole of the United Kingdom. Thus, all the provincial governments have one uniform homicide law and one body of law relating to the infant.
However, the United States adopted a federalist system, reserving for the states all those rights and powers not specifically delegated to the federal government in the U.S. Constitution. Each state, then, developed its own body of law (and precedent flowing therefrom) but, of course, within the constricts of the Constitution. Therefore, each state has its own penal code and homicide statutes; there is no national homicide law. America's legal history of infanticide has thus been truncated by its colonial status and fragmented by its federal system. No laws proscribing infanticide exist, no legislative battles as to its status have ever been waged in the U.S. Congress as they were in the British Parliament, and the crime is wholly under the aegis of state homicide statutes.
However, some vestiges of the medieval society's lack of regard for the infant's life can be discovered in American law. The state can legitimately protect the health and welfare of infants, and it exercises this power in many ways including determining custody and guardianship of children and prosecuting parents for child abuse. However, my review here will be limited to legal implications of certain activities in which parents (and other persons) have life and death power over infants or potential infants: (1) abortion, (2) proxy consent to medical treatment, and (3) Under what law or legal theory can the state protect the infant? A well-established duty ofthe state to its citizens is the protection of their health, safety and welfare. This duty imparts a power (commonly called the "police power") to the state by which it can achieve protection ofinfants' (and all citizens') lives. The police power to protect is not unbridled; the parameters of it are delineated by statute, by the U.S. Constitution, and by judicial decisions. Nor are the parameters static, but rather are a dynamic process always in flux in response to a society's values.
A crucial constitutional restriction upon the state's power is the body of rights granted to individual citizens and guaranteed within the U.S. Constitution. Thus, an action taken by the state to protect an infant may run counter to an individual's freedoms. Courts must then decide which value should prevail: the state's interest in its citizens -Catherine Damme or the individual's right to be free ofstate interference or control.
In balancing the individual's claim of unconstitutional restriction of his freedoms against the state's need to protect the public health and safety, the courts have developed a number of criteria to be met in the legitimization of a proposed action or statute. To determine the proper balance of rights versus interests, the courts usually apply a "minimum scrutiny" test for determining the constitutionality of various state actions. In a "minimal scrutiny" test, the court looks at a state statute or action with a strong presumption that it is valid. With this presumption, the court will not disturb state activities unless they blatantly lack a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest or unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or overbroad for their purpose.
However, this discussion must centre on the state's interest in the lives of infants both in rerum natura and in utero. Because such interests may collide with certain constitutional rights of parents (privacy rights or freedom to practise religion), a more rigorousjudicial test-that of "strict scrutiny,"-must be analysed.
Courts Infanticide: the worth ofan infant under law let life expire in the delivery room. As medical technology has advanced, the ability and opportunity to sustain life in such infants has presented serious ethical questions. No legal actions have ever been taken in regard to these delivery room deaths. What is noteworthy is that the life and death decisions are made without benefit of due process of law or even any institutionalized guidelines from a hospital or professional association. Rather, these decisions are made quickly in a delivery room within a short timespan. Society implicitly trusts the physician's judgment as to the prognosis for the infant.
If the physician chooses to place a deformed infant in a special-care or intensivecare nursery, the decision of life or death is shifted from physician (in the emergency context of the delivery room) to the parents. Then the decision becomes whether to withdraw medical treatment and allow a seriously deformed infant to die. One such situation was poignantly described by Dr. Raymond S. Duff and Dr. A. G. M. Campbell at Yale-New Haven Hospital:
[Al child had had chronic pulmonary disease after positive-pressure ventilation with high oxygen concentrations for treatment ofsevere idiopathic respiratory-distress syndrome. By five months of age, he still required 40 percent oxygen to survive, and even then, he was chronically dyspneic and cyanotic. He also suffered from cor pulmonale, which was difficult to control with digoxin and diuretics. The nurses, parents and physicians considered it cruel to continue and yet difficult to stop. All were attached to this child, whose life they had tried so hard to make worth-while. The family had endured high expenses (the hospital bill exceeding $15,000), and the strains of the illness were believed to be threatening the marriage bonds and to .be causing sibling behavioral disturbances. Oxygen supplementation was stopped, and the child died in about three hours. The family settled down and in 18 months had another baby, who was healthy." 1 The parents, here, chose death for their infant without fear of legal liability.11' The propriety of parental proxy consent to death was not questioned. The state has never definitively stepped in to control this decision or uphold the infant's right to life, however deformed or retarded that life may be. Are infants special? Would the state have interfered if the parents had attempted to make such a decision for an adult relative or a more fully matured infant?
The answer can be found in the case of In the matter ofKaren Quinlan.12 There the plaintiff-parents sought to withdraw Karen (then comatose 
